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Introduction 
 
A survey of Queensland Magistrates’ attitudes to domestic violence was 
conducted in May and June 2000.  All 96 Magistrates and Acting Magistrates in 
both urban and regional areas in Queensland were invited to respond to the 
survey.  Of the 96 surveys sent out, 38 responses were received, representing a 
response rate of 40 percent.2 
 
The survey instrument used was a modified version of the New South Wales 
                                                          
1 Parts of this paper have been developed from R Field, B Carpenter and S Currie (2003) “Issues 
in the Making of Ouster Orders Under the Domestic Violence (Family Protection) Act, 1989 (Qld)” 
in J Dewar and S Parker (eds) Family Law: Processes, Practices and Pressures (a selection of 
papers from the International Society of Family law's 10th World Conference), UK: Hart 
Publishing. 
2 The response from the NSW survey was 58%.  Note that throughout this paper victims of 
violence are consistently referred to as women.  This is because it has long been acknowledged, 
both by Australian and international research, that “women constitute the large majority of 
domestic violence victims.” – Queensland Domestic Violence Task Force (1988) Beyond These 
Walls, Brisbane: Goprint at 13.  Beyond These Walls refers to research pre-1988.  Further 
confirmation that women continue to make up the majority of victims of violence can be found in, 
for example, National Committee on Violence Against Women (1992) National Strategy on 
Violence Against Women, Commonwealth of Australia, and Department of the Prime Minister and 
Cabinet (Office of the Status of Women) (1995) Community Attitudes to Violence Against Women 
– Detailed Report, Canberra: AGPS.  This is not to deny, however, that men are sometimes 
victims of violence. 
Judicial Commission’s survey of New South Wales Magistrates conducted in 
1998.   The reason for replicating such a survey was five-fold.  First, as a 
response to the paucity of empirical qualitative research on domestic violence in 
Queensland.  Second, as a response to the Australian Law Reform 
Commission’s (ALRC) 1994 research which suggested that for many women the 
horror of the violence perpetrated against them had been compounded by the 
law’s failure to protect them.3  Third, as a contribution to the development of the 
legal discourse on domestic violence.4   Fourth, as a response to the ALRC’s call 
for more research and better data on women and the legal system.5  Fifth, due to 
concern that most legal research on domestic violence issues is not comparable 
because of the various methodologies used in different projects and across 
jurisdictions.  Finally, this project represents the first research to date on the 
views of Queensland Magistrates in relation to domestic violence.  
 
Demographics of Survey Respondents6 
 
With regard to gender, 9 of the 12 female Magistrates in Queensland responded 
(a response rate of 75%) and 28 of the 84 male Magistrates and Acting 
Magistrates responded (a response rate of 33%).  In NSW 56 male and 12 
female Magistrates responded.  With regard to age, in Queensland nearly half of 
all Magistrates (47.4%) were aged between 51-60 with an additional 36.8% aged 
between 41-50.  Similarly in NSW, 49% were aged between 51-60 and 38% 
between 41-50.  In response to jurisdiction, 47% of Queensland Magistrates 
spent more than half their time in metropolitan courts while 42% spent more than 
half their time in country courts.  In NSW most Magistrates (61%) spent more 
than half their time in metropolitan courts.  One third (36% spent half their time in 
country courts.  In Queensland, Magistrates estimated that the amount of time 
                                                          
3 Australian Law Reform Commission (1994) Equality Before the Law: Women’s Access to the 
Legal System, Report No. 67 (Interim)  Ch4.  
4 Office of Women’s Policy, (2000) Report of the Taskforce on Women and the Criminal Code, 
Dept of Justice and Attorney General, Queensland: Goprint. 
5 Australian Law Reform Commission (1994) Equality Before the Law, Report No.69, 
Commonwealth of Australia, Parts I and II. 
6 This information is gleaned from questions 1.1-1.5 of the survey 
spent on domestic violence protection orders ranged from 5-40% of court time, 
with the majority of Magistrates claiming between 5-10% of their time in court 
spent on domestic violence orders.  In NSW, Magistrates estimated that the 
amount of time spent on apprehended violence orders ranged from 5-75% of 
court time.  Over two thirds of the Magistrates estimated that they spent between 
10-20% of their time on such orders. 
 
Key Themes and Issues Identified through the Survey. 
 
Magistrates believe they are adequately trained to deal with domestic violence 
issues.   
Magistrates view domestic violence as a dispute between the parties that can be 
addressed appropriately by informal dispute resolution processes such as 
counselling and mediation. 
Magistrates believe that women are using domestic violence proceedings as a 
tactic in family law matters. 
Magistrates are reluctant to issue ouster orders except in cases of severe 
physical violence. 
Magistrates are concerned about the workload associated with domestic violence 
matters. 
 Magistrates have a limited understanding of issues of domestic violence for 
Indigenous women. 
Magistrates support the work of police in the area of domestic violence – 
particularly police prosecutors. 
Magistrates are wary of too much community contact believing this to decrease 
their objectivity. 
Magistrates consider their judicial role crucial in their dealings with domestic 
violence cases. 
 
For the purposes of this paper, two issues will be highlighted and discussed in 
some detail: first, Magistrates’ belief that women are using domestic violence 
proceedings as a tactic in family law matters; and second, Magistrates’ 
reluctance to issue ouster orders except in cases of severe physical violence.  
These issues are analysed here in the context that a majority of Magistrates in 
Queensland (71%) and NSW (90%) believe that they are adequately trained to 
deal with domestic violence matters, with many citing life experiences as more 
important that legal training in this regard.7   We argue however, that the issues 
identified below support a need for ongoing and specific training on domestic 
violence to assist in the administration of justice in this context, particularly for 
women. 
 
Magistrates believe that women are using domestic violence proceedings as a 
tactic in family law matters. 
 
The belief that Magistrates see domestic violence as a tactic in family law 
matters was gleaned most specifically from question 3.5 of the survey which 
asked Magistrates to agree or disagree with the statement “Domestic Violence 
Protection Orders are often used by applicants in Family Court proceedings as a 
tactic to aid their case and deprive their partner from contact with the children.”  
74% of Queensland Magistrates who responded to the survey agreed with the 
statement with a number maintaining that many women were advised by their 
solicitors to apply for orders: 
“Yes.  My solicitor told me to take out a DV order is often heard.” (15)8 
“I am certain of this.  Parties at times even admit to the above and often they take 
the above action on the advice of their solicitors.  This makes it hard for the 
genuine cases to gain credibility in the eyes of the court and should be 
discouraged.” (30) 
“Agree.  Have seen this on numerous occasions in Court.  It has been virtually 
admitted as such in both DV and family law applications.” (4) 
                                                          
7 This information was gained from Q4.2 of the survey which asked Magistrates “Do you feel that 
your training has adequately prepared you for dealing with domestic violence matters?” 
8 A sequential numbering system was employed when entering the qualitative data.  Each 
number corresponds to a completed survey received.  The numbering was in order of receipt of 
survey.  
“Agree – I have been informed on more than one occasion the only reason 
application was made was on legal advice.” (29) 
 
Of the 74% who agreed with the statement, just over half (55%) attempted to 
qualify their position by suggesting that this was not the case all of the time:  
“I am satisfied that this has occurred on some occasions in my court – I have no 
idea of how often.” (21)  
“Sometimes used – it is often suggested to be the case.  Family Court could do 
more to allay these fears.” (31) 
“Agree in some cases only.  And it works very effectively.” (1) 
 
Other questions not specifically related to the use of domestic violence orders as 
a tactical strategy in Family Court proceedings also on occasion elicited 
comment on this issue.    For example, question 2.8, which  asked Magistrates 
“In your experience how well does the Domestic Violence (Family Protection) Act 
1989, dovetail with the Family Law Act?” resulted in 21% indicating that domestic 
violence applications are used as a tool in family law proceedings.  Examples of 
the qualitative comments made are as follows: 
“There is no doubt that the DV Act is used as a tool in the Family Law Act 
proceedings even if it is not in the majority” (1); 
“I must say that I am aware of cases where parties have been told by their legal 
representatives and on their own accord to obtain a DV order to enhance their 
chances in the Family Court”(16); 
“Some applicants for orders are motivated by pending family law matters”(8); 
“In my experience the DV Court is abused often on the advice of solicitors, to 
obtain leverage in Family Law Court – many applications are withdrawn or not 
pursued with family Court hearings being finalised before a DV hearing has been 
determined” (30); 
“Not well.  This is always in my mind – ulterior motives re: contact and residency” 
(31); 
“Not at all well.  Domestic violence applications are made to assist in Family 
Court applications”(6); 
 
Similarly, when asked in question 4.2 “Do you feel that your training has 
adequately prepared you for dealing with domestic violence matters?”, one 
Magistrate indicated that training on domestic violence would assist in 
understanding “the personal dynamics and allegations of the parties involved in 
family law proceedings in manoeuvring themselves into advantageous positions 
by the use of DV legislation.” (2)    
 
These views of Magistrates are of significant concern and whilst it is a 
perspective that has been iterated in other contexts as well,9 research tells us 
that it is not correct.   
  
For example, the research of Melville and Hunter which involved the examination 
of 176 family court files, found 95 files containing evidence of domestic violence 
(which represented 54% of the total number of cases).  Of these, 38% involved 
instances where a protection order had not been obtained.10  “This would 
suggest that … in cases where domestic violence is an issue, women may in fact 
be reluctant to take out” protection orders.11  Further, “there is a lack of empirical 
evidence to suggest that women believe that allegations of domestic violence 
provide an advantage in family law proceedings, or that they fabricate allegations 
to gain tactical advantage.”12  Similarly, other studies have found that women are 
often reluctant to take out protection orders, and consider such action to be a last 
                                                          
9   For example, Melville and Hunter refer to a statement by Hon PJ Hannaford in the NSW 
Legislative Council: “Whilst we might not like it, AVO proceedings are being used as tools in 
custody battles and in matrimonial arrangements.  I believe that this is an inappropriate use of 
AVO’s.”:  Criminal Law Review Division, NSW Attorney-General’s Department (1999) quoted in A 
Melville and R Hunter (2001) “’As Everybody Knows’: Countering Myths of Gender Bias in Family 
law” 10(1) Griffith Law Review 124 at 127. Melville and Hunter also comment: “In our interviews, 
several family law solicitors also expressed a belief in this myth, asserting that many women were 
‘access bitches’, who deliberately fabricated allegations in order to deny contact.”: at 127. 
10  Melville and Hunter (2001) at 124. 
11  Melville and Hunter (2001) at 128. 
12  Melville and Hunter (2001) at 128. 
resort.13  And a study into child sexual abuse allegations in Australian family law 
proceedings has also found that, in a majority of cases, allegations were not 
made for tactical advantage.14   
 
Further, although changes to the Family Law Act, 1975 (Cth) in 1996 included 
the issue of family violence as a relevant consideration in terms of determining 
the best interest of children, and although it has also been increasingly (recently) 
acknowledged within the court that children are detrimentally affected by violence 
(see for example, In the Marriage of Jaeger,15 and In the Marriage of Patsalou16) 
there are a number of reasons why women are likely to be reluctant to use 
domestic violence as a tactical issue in Family Court proceedings. 
 
First, historically, the Family Court has been reluctant to take domestic violence 
into account and has actively failed to do so.  It is this history which informs the 
way the Court currently deals with issues of violence in both children’s and 
property matters. 
 
For example, the Australian Law Reform Commission reported in 1994 that 
"evidence of violence against a spouse is often excluded or discounted at 
different stages of the legal system and that the Family Court often does not give 
proper weight to the existence and effects of violence."17  Further, Alexander 
refers to “cases in which the court has discounted a history of violence 
                                                          
13  For example, J Stubbs and D Powell (1989) Domestic Violence: Impact of Legal Reform in 
NSW, Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research, L Trimboli and R Bonney (1997) An Evaluation 
of the NSW Apprehended Violence Order Scheme, NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and 
Research, and R Wearing (1992) Monitoring the Impact of the Crimes (Family Violence) Act 
1987, LaTrobe University. 
14   M Hume (1995) “Study of Child Sexual Abuse Allegations Within The Family Court of 
Australia”, Paper Presented at Enhancing Access to Justice: Family Court of Australia, Second 
National Conference, Sydney 20-23 September. 
15  (1994) 18 Fam LR 126. 
16  (1994) 18 Fam LR 426 
17  ALRC (1994) Report No. 69 at 167.  Submissions to the Joint Select Committee Enquiry of 1991 
also indicated that "there is a need for changes to the manner in which some judges of the court, and 
Magistrates with family law jurisdiction, approach the resolution of disputes over children in cases 
where domestic violence is involved.": Joint Select Committee on Certain Aspects of the Operation 
and Interpretation of the Family Law Act (1992)  Report  Canberra: AGPS at 145. 
(characterising such behaviour as going to the issue of marital fault and therefore 
to be ignored) and made orders for custody or access even when future violence 
was a real possibility.”18  Prior to the 1996 amendments there were only very few 
cases in the history of the court in which domestic violence was directly 
discussed as relevant to the determination of proceedings,19 and the Chief 
Justice has had to acknowledge that many criticisms of the Court have related “to 
its approach on a legal basis to family violence issues."20 
 
As a consequence of the Court's failure to recognise the relevance of violence, 
there has been little incentive for women in terms of raising domestic violence 
issues in court.  For example, in terms of the writing of Family Reports (which are 
a crucial aspect of assisting the Court to determine the best interests of children), 
it has been the experience of Women's Legal Service, Brisbane, that in the past, 
if violence were mentioned "it was usually in a throwaway fashion such as 'the 
                                                          
18  R Alexander, (2002) “Domestic Violence in Australia: The Legal Response”, 3rd ed, The Federation 
Press: Sydney at 57 referring to Heidt and Heidt ((1976) FLC 90-077), Chandler and Chandler 
((1981) FLC 91-008) and Danci and Danci ((1984) FLC 91-560). 
19  In the Marriage of JG and BG (18 Fam LR 255) Justice Chisholm stated that "there are relatively 
few Australian decisions which expressly deal with family violence in [the context of custody and 
access] ."  He went on to identify some of the cases which had dealt with general issues of parental 
behaviour and misbehaviour as follows:  Barnett v Barnett (1973) 2 ALR 19; 21 Fam LR 335 at 343; 
Marriage of Kress (1976) 2 Fam LR 11,230, Marriage of Smythe (1983) 8 Fam LR 1029, and In the 
Marriage of Schenck (1981) 7 Fam LR 170.  Justice Chisholm then discussed two reported decisions 
specifically dealing with allegations of violence in the context of custody proceedings:  Marriage of 
Heidt (1976) 1 Fam LR 11,576 and Marriage of Chandler (1981) 6 Fam LR 736.  In Heidt Murray J 
distinguished between violence directed at the wife (which was largely considered irrelevant) and 
violence directed at the children.  In Chandler Nygh J considered a number of the allegations of 
violence as irrelevant to the welfare of the children.  Justice Chisholm endorsed these cases as 
providing correct principles, but reinterpreted them saying that it was not the intention of the Justices 
involved to lay down a rule of law to the effect that violence is relevant only if it 'directly' affects the 
children. Justice Chisholm continued, "each was concerned to emphasise the important point that the 
Family law Act strictly limits the relevance of marital misconduct.  In the context of custody cases, the 
court has always been properly concerned to prevent parties from engaging in general attacks, or 
smear campaigns, that are unrelated to the children's welfare.  The court no doubt felt that it was 
important to emphasise this in the early years of the Act's operation.  This is clearly correct:  the 
principle that the child's welfare is paramount has an exclusionary aspect, excluding material that has 
no relevance to the welfare of the children.  But it also has an inclusionary aspect, by which I mean 
that admissible evidence that is relevant to the children's welfare should be taken into account.  It 
may be that in their concern to discourage parties from using custody proceedings as an occasion to 
engage in a general criticism of each other's behaviour, unrelated to the children's welfare, Murray J 
and Nygh J somewhat overemphasised the exclusionary aspect of the principle.  If so, then I must 
respectfully differ.  I believe it is clear law that matters truly relevant to the child's welfare, whether 
indirectly or directly relevant should be taken into account.":  18 Fam LR 255 at 259. 
20  A Nicholson (1995) “The Family Court – 1994 and Beyond” 10(2) Australian Family Lawyer 1 at 8. 
wife alleges violence'."21   The Service has suggested that the writers of reports 
have in fact been reluctant to deal with the issue of domestic violence, its 
dynamics and impact on women and their children, as a result of a lack of 
understanding and training in domestic violence, or because they have been 
concerned to avoid any perception of their taking sides or laying blame.22  
 
The Court, then, has failed to recognise the reality of many women's 
experience,23 and its processes have not been “responsive to clients who are or 
have been affected by violence."24  The message from the Court to society, and 
more specifically to victims of violence, has been one that has said that violence 
is not important, and that there are no serious legal consequences in the Family 
Court context for perpetrators of violence.  Based on this history, there is little 
reason for women to think it prudent to use issues of domestic violence for 
tactical advantage in the Family Court. 
  
                                                          
21  Women’s Legal Service, Brisbane (1995) Draft Submission to the Family Law Council’s Enquiry 
Into Violence and the Family Law Act, November at 3. 
22  "Clients have advised us that report writers have been 'taken in' by their violent partner's charm.  
He came across in the report as reasonable and cooperative.  It is quite common for perpetrators of 
violence to present as articulate and charming whilst to their wife and children they are controlling and 
violent.": Women’s Legal Service, Brisbane (1995) at 3.    
23  J Behrens (1996) “Ending the Silence, But … Family Violence under the Family Law Reform Act 
1995” 10 Australian Journal of Family Law 35 at 35. 
24  Women’s Legal Service, Brisbane (1995) at 5.  For example, compulsory attendance at court 
forces the victim and perpetrator into close proximity, which can be at the least very difficult for 
women, and at worst very dangerous.  Notwithstanding the comments of the Chief Justice in T. 
Pegler and F. Farouque, "Family Court not a factor in murders, says Nicholson" The Age, 28 March, 
1996 at A2, it should be noted that the Chief Justice's Direction regarding family violence issued in 
January 1993 acknowledged problems associated with court design:  "There is a need to protect 
victims of family violence who use the Court's services. ...  At the commencement of litigation and 
thereafter, there are a number of occasions where people are required to be present at the Court, 
either because of the requirements of the case management guidelines, for purposes of conciliation 
or mediation, or because of the necessity to attend Court offices, interlocutory hearings or at trial.  It 
must be recognised that in cases where there are allegations of family violence ... , the very presence 
of the person at the Court's premises may place her or him in jeopardy, if the allegations are well 
founded.  Equally, a person's fear may be severe and disabling even though others may think that the 
allegations are not well founded."  The Chief Justice has also said:  "The Court cannot, of course, 
guarantee the safety of its litigants any more than the police can guarantee the safety of citizens.  
However, the Court, with the assistance of the Marshal and now the Deputy Marshal, has a much 
more sophisticated security system than was ever the case in the past, both in relation to its buildings 
and to its procedures, and has developed much better liaison with Federal and State and Territory 
police forces.  It is not possible to discuss these matters in detail but it does mean that litigants in the 
Court are better protected than was the case in the past.":  Nicholson (1995) at 9. 
Given the suggestion that these failings of the Court in its approach to issues of 
violence can be directly linked to the fact that until recently Australia's family law 
legislation has been silent about violence,25 we might expect there to have been 
an improvement in terms of the operation of the reform provisions since 1996.  
These provisions, as we mentioned above, have made domestic violence 
specifically relevant to considering the best interests of the child in residence and 
contact matters.26  However, this is where the second contra-indication of women 
using domestic violence issues for a tactical advantage in the Family Court 
becomes evident. 
 
The second contra-indication is that issues of domestic violence are being 
considered secondary to the new principle that "children have a right of contact, 
on a regular basis, with both their parents".27  This prioritisation of the right of 
contact with fathers makes it difficult for survivors of domestic violence to 
convince the court that because of the history of violence in the family, the child’s 
best interests would be better served by limiting or preventing contact with their 
violent father.28  Rather, women who raise issues of violence in proceedings risk 
appearing as though they are not prioritising the rights of the children to contact 
                                                          
25  See the National Committee on Violence Against Women (1992) National Strategy on Violence 
Against Women, Canberra: AGPS at 19. 
26   It should also be noted that it is only recently that the Court has recognised the relevance of 
domestic violence to property proceedings.  See, for example, S Middleton (2002) “Domestic 
Violence and Contributions to the Welfare of the Family: Why Not Negative?” 16(1) Australian 
Journal of Family Law 26 referring to the following cases:  In the Marriage of Doherty (1995) 127 
FLR 343; (1995) 20 Fam LR 137; (1996) FLC 92-652; In the Marriage of Marando (1997) 21 Fam 
LR 841; (1997) FLC 92-754; In the Marriage of Kennon (1997) 139 FLR 118; (1997) 22 Fam LR 
1; (1997) FLC 92-757.  See also on this issue: J Behrens, (1993) “Domestic Violence and 
Property Adjustment: a Critique of ‘No-Fault’ Discourse” 7(1) Australian Journal of Family Law 9, 
J Behrens, (1995) “Violence in the Home and Family law: An Update” 9(1) Australian Journal of 
Family Law 70, Australian Law Reform Commission (1994) Report No.69, at paras 9.47-9.54, and 
R Alexander (1996) “Family Violence and Family Court Litigation: A Feminist Perspective” 3(2) 
Psychiatry, Psychology and Law 119. 
27  See s.60B(2) - although this right is conditional on its not being "contrary to a child's best 
interests".   See H Rhoades, R Graycar and M Harrison (1999) The Family Law Reform Act 1995: 
Can Changing Legislation Change Legal Culture, Legal Practice and Community Expectations?  
Interim Report.  The University of Sydney and Family Court of Australia. 
28  Women’s Legal Service, Brisbane (1995) at 3.  Although Nygh believed before the provisions had 
been tested that "the new [violence provisions] will ... mean that the 'right' of the child to contact with a 
violent parent will be strongly counterbalanced.":  P Nygh (1996) “The New Part VII – an Overview” 
10 Australian Journal of Family Law 4 at 14. 
with the other parent.  They also risk appearing difficult and uncooperative, 
issues which potentially impact on their credibility in proceedings in terms of their 
being a parent with whom it is in the best interests of the child to reside.   
 
The result then is that the principle of contact with both parents has the practical 
effect of silencing women on issues of violence.   The wording of this principle in 
no way acknowledges the potential for an existing contextual environment of 
violence.  Rather, Rendell, Rathus and Lynch note that “the ‘right to contact 
principle’ has been given greater emphasis by most practitioners and judges than 
the domestic violence aspect of the reforms.”29   
 
In addition it should be remembered that notwithstanding provisions that 
legislatively acknowledge the importance of domestic violence, it is always 
difficult for women to raise issues of violence in formal legal proceedings.  "The 
level of risk is often felt by the women but it can be difficult for them to articulate 
or convince others of its reality.”30  On the other hand, "violent men are experts at 
trumpeting their legal rights as a way of intimidating their partners."31  
 
The third contra-indication of women using domestic violence for tactical 
purposes in Family Court proceedings is the current emphasis on the use of 
informal dispute resolution processes (such as mediation) to promote private 
agreement between parties to Family Court proceedings.32 This has silenced 
many women on the issue of violence for a number of reasons.   
 
First, informal dispute resolution processes are based on consensual dispute 
resolution in a private environment away from the formal protections of legal 
proceedings – such as legal representation.  It is often not possible for a woman 
                                                          
29   K Rendell, Z Rathus and A Lynch (2000) An Unacceptable Risk: A Report on Child Contact 
Arrangements Where There is Violence in the Family, Women’s Legal Service, Brisbane at 21 
referring to Rhoades, Graycar and Harrison (1999). 
30  Z Rathus (1995) Submission on Family Law Reform Bill 1994, Women’s Legal Service, 
Brisbane at 10. 
31  Rathus (1995) at 10. 
32  See Part III of the Family Law Act and s.60B(2)(d) and s.63B.  See also Behrens (1996) at 39. 
who is a victim of violence in this context to confidently represent her own 
interests against her former violent partner, or raise issues such as a history of 
violence.  And it is a context in which “to get things over with” victims will often 
minimise issues of violence, and perhaps put their own safety at risk in terms of 
contact with the children, in order to comply with the imperative of consensual 
and cooperative dispute resolution.  
 
Secondly, the rhetoric about the inappropriateness of mediation for victims of 
violence (which is very soundly based and acknowledged in, for example, the 
Courts’ Practice Direction on Family Violence, and also the Family Law Council’s 
Report on Family Mediation33) has meant that in some circumstances women 
victims of violence are denied access to informal processes.  This is appropriate 
on many grounds, for example, because violence creates an extreme power 
imbalance between the parties that mediators are unable realistically to 
redress;34 because informal processes can further endanger the victim – 
physically and emotionally; and because informal processes, being private 
processes, are not accountable in terms of the fairness or justice of the 
outcomes.  Further, training of mediators and facilitators is not yet sufficient to 
allow for the safe participation of victims of violence in informal processes.  
Nevertheless, a consequence of cutting off the option of informal dispute 
resolution processes for women who are victims of violence is that many such 
women, who cannot afford litigation and who also cannot get Legal Aid, will be 
silent on the issue of violence in order to access at least some assistance in 
communicating with their former partner about separation matters.  
                                                          
33   Family law Council of Australia (1992) Report on Family Mediation, at xiii.  The report states 
that mediation is not appropriate where there is a fear or threat of violence or abuse or where 
violence or abuse is occurring. 
34   See for example, R Field (1996) “Mediation and the Art of Power (Im)balancing” 12 QUT Law 
Journal 264, R Field (2000) “Neutrality and Power: Myths and Reality”3(1) The ADR Bulletin 16 
and Zylstra’s comment that that mediation is acknowledged as being “far too brief an encounter to 
adequately address and counteract the effects of long-term abuse and the socially sanctioned 
domination of men over women which results in submission, placating, obliging, and 
accommodating behaviour on the woman’s part”:  A Zylstra (2001) “Mediation and Domestic 
Violence: A Practical Screening Method for Mediators and Mediation Program Administrators”, 
Journal of Dispute Resolution 253 at 256 
 On the other hand, if women participate in informal dispute resolution processes 
and raise issues relating to a history of violence with their former partner, they 
risk offending the future focus of informal processes, and also risk being labelled 
difficult and uncooperative, a label which we noted above will potentially impact 
negatively on the way they are perceived in any later proceedings in court.   
 
There are, therefore, a number of important reasons why women might actively 
avoid raising issues of violence in Family Court related proceedings.  These 
issues also assist our understanding of the reality, quite contrary to the myth, that 
women are in fact silenced about violence in Family Court proceedings.  It is 
legitimate then to ask why is it that Magistrates think that domestic violence is 
being used as a tactic?  
 
Our answer is that the current legislative relevance of domestic violence has 
resulted perhaps in domestic violence being increasingly, legitimately, raised in 
Family Court proceedings. That is, lawyers have a responsibility to raise with 
their clients the possibility of such issues being brought before the Court, and this 
is potentially increasing the number of occasions when domestic violence is 
raised as an issue in relation to, especially, the best interests of children.35  In 
this context it is important to consider that “a commonality of violence among 
those who divorce is evident.  When broadly defined, spousal violence is not an 
exceptional circumstance for divorced women and men but the norm.”36  This 
means that rather than domestic violence being raised as a tactical issue – it is 
being raised as a legitimate legally relevant consideration.  The casting of 
legitimate issues of domestic violence into the realm of ‘tactical advantage’ 
indicates a disbelief on the part of Magistrates about the veracity of women’s 
                                                          
35   Note however issues arising from the principle of contact with both parents as discussed 
above. 
36   G Sheehan and B Smyth (2000) “Spousal Violence and Post-Separation Financial Outcomes” 
14 Australian Journal of Family Law 102 at 117.  Trimboli and Bonney also point out that “the 
timing of applications for protection orders “may reflect the fact that violence often escalates at 
the time of separation and the issuing of an application for parenting orders (or indeed may 
precipitate separation).”: (1997) 
assertions of violence against them.  This disbelief is a serious issue which must 
be addressed.   
 
Further, the reality of the misogyny that is present in the men’s rights lobby must 
be acknowledged as a strong force in promoting the myth that women are using 
domestic violence for tactical advantage in the Family Court.  Those groups have 
been successful in creating a strong backlash against women litigants in the 
Family Court context.37  As Hunter and Melville have said the “myths of the men’s 
movement are not the beliefs of a fraction of men who blindly resist social 
change, but instead demonstrate the resilience of hegemonic masculinity.”38   
There is, therefore, a great need for the myth to be dispelled if women who are 
victims of violence are to access justice in family law proceedings. 
 
Our view is that an important approach to dispelling the myth about domestic 
violence being used as a tactic in Family Court matters is the training of key 
judicial officers, such as Magistrates, who deal with domestic violence matters on 
a daily basis.  Such training involves replacing the myth with reality,39 and facing 
the societal and legal assumptions that perpetuate a culture of violence against 
women.40 
 
Magistrates are reluctant to issue ouster orders except in cases of severe 
physical violence.   
 
Ouster orders, also known as sole occupancy or exclusion orders, ensure that a 
                                                          
37   See for example, M Kaye and J Tolmie (1998) “’Lollies at a Children’s Party’ and Other Myths: 
Violence, Protection Orders and Fathers’ Rights Groups” 10 Current Issues in Criminal Justice 52 
and M Kaye and J Tolmie (1998) “Father’s Rights Groups in Australia and their Engagement with 
Issues in Family law” 12 Australian Journal of Family Law 19. 
38   Melville and Hunter (2001) at 135. 
39   See for example, S Todd (1994) “Fears About Abuse of the Legislation are Unjustified: The 
Other Half of the AVO Story” Law Society Journal December at 38 and H Spowart and R Neil 
(1997) “Stop in the Name of Love” 22 Alternative Law Journal 81. 
40   See for example, R Graycar (1990) “Equality begins at Home” in R Graycar (ed) Dissenting 
Opinions: Feminist Explorations in Law and Society, Allen and Unwin, and R Graycar (1989) 
“Equal Rights versus Father’s Rights: The Child Custody Debate in Australia” in C Smart and S 
Sevenhuijsen (eds) Child Custody and the Politics of Gender, Routledge. 
perpetrator of violence is removed from the family home, and that the victim and 
her children are able to avoid the cost and dislocation of escaping to alternative 
accommodation.  The Domestic Violence (Family protection) Act 1989 (Qld)41 
(the Act) provides that a condition can be placed on a protection order made 
under the Act which prohibits a perpetrator of domestic violence from remaining 
in, entering (or attempting to enter) or approaching within a stated distance of, a 
particular premises.42  A protection order with such a condition attached to it 
works to override any legal or equitable interest the perpetrator may have in the 
property.43   
 
The making of ouster orders is controversial44 because they involve 
superordinating and prioritising the housing, support, social and familial needs of 
women and their children in a situation where in the past they have been 
subordinated to a societal assumption that it is the woman’s responsibility to 
escape domestic violence.45   
 
Ouster orders raise the issue of increased requirements for funding of men’s 
emergency accommodation – and there is concern that this may be at the risk of 
funding for victim’s services.  They challenge legal notions of proprietorial rights, 
                                                          
41 Other domestic violence legislation around Australia containing ouster order provisions 
includes: the Domestic Violence Act, 1992 (NT), Crimes Act 1900 Part 15A – Apprehended 
Violence Orders (NSW), Crimes (Family Violence) Act 1987 (Vic), Justice Act, 1902 (WA), 
Justices Act, 1959 Part XA (Tas), Domestic Violence Act, 1986 (ACT).   
42 S.25, Domestic Violence (Family Protection) Act, 1989 (Qld). 
43 S.25(3)(b), Domestic Violence (Family Protection) Act, 1989 (Qld).  The Federal draft model 
domestic violence legislation includes a section almost identical to the Queensland provision 
indicating national support for the ouster condition and its consistent availability for all Australian 
victims of domestic violence:  Domestic Violence Legislation Working Group (1999) Model 
Domestic Violence Laws – Report, Canberra: AGPS, s.16(2)(b) at 74.  
44 The issue was acknowledged by the Australian Law Reform Commission in 1986 as 
“controversial”: Australian Law Reform Commission (1986) Report (No 30) Domestic Violence, 
Canberra: AGPS at 44. 
45 “There is a need to diversify models (of services) to fit the needs of women rather than women 
attempting to fit the (current) model. This is very much needed in an environment where funding 
is limited for services responding to domestic and family violence and the societal expectation for 
women to leave a violent situation still exists.” - Partnerships Against Domestic Violence (2000) 
Home Safe Home – The Link Between Domestic and Family Violence and Women’s 
Homelessness, Canberra: AGPS at 31 referring to N Stanes (1998) “Meeting Women’s Needs – 
innovative service models responding to women escaping violence”, 5 Women Against Violence 
December 44-49. 
that a “man’s home is his castle”.46  And yet they also offer one of the most 
legally and socially significant ways to ensure that a perpetrator of domestic 
violence is held responsible for his actions, as well as providing some sense of 
normalcy for women and children whose lives are otherwise chaos.  In addition 
ouster orders address the inevitable “poverty and dislocation caused by (women 
and children) having to leave the family home”.47  In short they can be seen as an 
effective alternative tool to address issues of homelessness that confront 
survivors of violence and their children. 
 
Magistrates in Queensland make orders under the act on a daily basis.  They are 
key players in ensuring that victims of violence achieve justice through the legal 
system and as such their understanding of issues relating to ouster orders is very 
important.  Research in other states tells us that Magistrates have been reluctant 
to make such orders and that in 1987 only 3.2% of orders made in New South 
Wales included a requirement that the offender no longer reside in the family 
home48.  We also know that in some jurisdictions, the likelihood of obtaining an 
ouster order ex parte is low unless the Magistrate is able to see physical injury49.  
And we know that police seem reluctant to assist with excluding perpetrators 
from their home as very few police initiate applications including a request for 
such a condition.50  Finally it has been suggested that many self-representing 
women do not know that the ouster order option exists.51 
 
                                                          
46 “Workers and survivors often comment that the courts appear reluctant to limit the perpetrator’s 
access to ‘his castle’” - J Nunn “’Sole Occupancy’ Orders” in NSW Women’s Refuge Movement, 
Domestic Violence and Incest Resource Centre, Council to Homeless Persons (eds) (2001) Out 
of the Fire: Domestic Violence and Homelessness, at 35. 
47 Department of Families, Youth and Community Care (QLD) (1996) “Where to from here? – 
Report on the needs of women who have experienced domestic violence” Queensland 
Government at 11. 
48 J Stewart (1990) Report to the Department of Community Services on Responses to Domestic 
Violence in Tasmania;  R Wearing (1991) “Family Violence: Has Anything Changed in 4 Years?” 
5 Socio-Legal Bulletin at 4-5; National Committee on Violence Against Women (1992) at 53; J 
Stubbs and D Powell (1989) Domestic Violence: The Impact of Legal Reform in NSW Sydney: 
NSW Bureau of Crime Statistics and Research at 31. 
49 Nunn (2001) at 35. 
50 Nunn (2001) at 35. 
51 Nunn (2001) at 35. 
In this survey, Queensland Magistrates were asked: “Do you feel comfortable 
ousting a violent person from their home?”  A total of 79% of Queensland 
Magistrates surveyed responded positively to the question, with 21% of 
Magistrates stating that they did not feel comfortable about making an ouster 
order.   Those Magistrates who felt uncomfortable were all male.   This result 
would seem, on the face of it, to contradict some of the concerns raised in other 
jurisdictions.  However, we have taken the view that although many Magistrates 
may assert that they feel comfortable making such an order (because that was 
the word used in the question) this comfort may not necessarily translate into 
appropriate numbers of orders actually being made.  Certainly an analysis of the 
qualitative comments that accompanied the quantitative data for the question 
suggests this to be the case.  The issues raised through these comments, 
discussed below, also provide an important indication of a possible need for 
specific training in this area for Magistrates. 
 
The first key issue is that, in order for many Magistrates to feel comfortable 
ousting a violent person from their home, it seems important that the violence 
must be seen to be relatively severe: 
“If physical violence yes” (5); 
“When the circumstances are bad enough” (37); 
“Yes. Provided the circumstances warrant it” (13); 
“Yes. Providing there are sufficient grounds” (14); 
Severity, in terms of conceptions of domestic violence, usually requires an 
element of physical violence to be present.  This finding concurs with research on 
Magistrates and the making of orders under domestic violence legislation in 
Victoria conducted by Ingrid Wilson which also indicated the priority of 
importance placed on physical violence.52   What this means is that Magistrates 
                                                          
52 IM Wilson (1992) ’Were these Serious Assaults?’:  An Analysis of Magistrates’ Dialogue During 
Proceedings for Intervention Orders Under the Crimes (Family Violence) Act 1987 – thesis 
completed in satisfaction of requirements of the BA (Hons) in Criminology at the University of 
Melbourne.  Steiner confirms that “most Magistrates will grant (an ouster) condition when the 
application has not been served only if serious domestic violence is alleged, the aggrieved has 
children in her care and they are also at risk if the respondent is permitted to remain in the 
consider ouster orders to be justified only as a last resort measure, and “when 
the circumstances are bad enough”. 
 
However, circumstances where there is a clear and present danger to the woman 
and where there is evidence of physical violence are precisely those 
circumstances in which ouster orders are likely to be most inappropriate.53  That 
is, where a woman is frightened for her physical safety, and also for her children, 
she is least likely to want to remain in the family home and most likely to need 
the security and safety of refuge accommodation.  Magistrates should therefore 
not rely on the criterion of circumstances being “bad enough” for the issuing of 
ouster orders because it is more appropriately where the circumstances are 
“good enough” that such orders should be made.   
 
A second key issue for Magistrates appears to be a reluctance to issue ouster 
orders ex parte.  That is, many Magistrates do not feel comfortable ousting a 
perpetrator of violence from his home unless the respondent has been given the 
opportunity to be heard and to defend his case: 
“Yes. Provided that the person has been heard by the court and present when 
the order is made” (1) 
“No problem once justice has been served by the respondent having the 
opportunity to attend court” (35) 
“Yes but the violent person should be given the opportunity to respond”(18) 
                                                                                                                                                                             
matrimonial home, and the aggrieved is able to indicate to the Magistrate that the respondent has 
alternative accommodation available to him/her.” – C Steiner (2001) “Working practically with the 
legislation and potential issues for practitioners” in Domestic Violence – Queensland Law Society 
Continuing Legal Education Seminar Papers (25 September) at 2. 
53 “Obviously there are women and children for whom this is not an option where the perpetrator 
is particularly violent and relentless in his pursuit of the woman.  As violence often increases 
following separation this is an important consideration in pursuing such a shift in practice.  This is 
not a suitable choice either for women and children who do not wish to remain in the house where 
they experienced the trauma of domestic or family violence.  Where there have been high levels 
of violence and the perpetrator is relentless in continuing to pursue the woman it is unlikely the 
woman would choose to remain in the home with such a high risk to safety.  In essence where 
the woman and children consider their safety to be a major risk this is not an option at the point of 
crisis.  For some of these women it could be an option at a later stage.”  - The Home Safe Home 
Report (2000) at 56. 
This approach satisfies liberal legal notions of natural justice but also potentially 
results in an encouragement by the system of the perpetrator’s denial and 
mitigation of his behaviour.  That is, if a perpetrator has to deny his violent 
behaviour in order to stay in his home the system is failing to encourage him to 
take responsibility for his violence.  Further, although only one of the surveyed 
Magistrates mentioned the issue of the respondent’s legal or equitable interests 
in the property as a consideration, it is possible that the reluctance of Magistrates 
to make ex parte ouster orders is linked to a respect for these interests.  If this is 
the case, legal process is allowing a perpetrator’s property rights to be 
superordinated over the rights of women and children to live free of violence in 
their own home. 
 
Additionally, where a woman is seeking an ouster condition under a protection 
order, she is indicating to the court that she feels safe to remain in the home if 
the perpetrator is removed.  If the Magistrate is satisfied that a protection order 
should be issued under the legislation, then the requested ouster condition 
should be included in that order, whether or not the perpetrator is present in court 
at the time it was made.  To do otherwise means that a perpetrator can ensure 
that an ouster order is not made by simply not being present in court.  
 
A third issue arises as a result of the assertion by Magistrates of their objective 
legally focused approach to the issuing of ouster orders.  That is, many 
Magistrates said that it was irrelevant whether or not they felt comfortable making 
such orders because if the order “must be made then it is made”: 
“In the context of the DV legislation if it is found that a person who committed an 
act of DV to the extent that such an order has to be made then I will make it.  It is 
not to the point whether or not I feel personally comfortable” (28) 
“My comfort is not relevant.  If the circumstances of the case require that I do, 
then I do” (32) 
This indicates a commitment to notions of objective justice which perhaps belies 
the subjective nature of the exercise of a Magistrate’s discretion in responding to 
applications for ouster orders.  We would argue that a Magistrate’s feelings about 
the idea of ousting a person from their home certainly are relevant to whether 
these orders are being made or not.  In order for justice to be served in the 
exercise of a Magistrate’s discretion in making ouster orders, it may be 
necessary for Magistrates to more openly acknowledge the part their own 
feelings on the issue play in the making of such orders. 
 
A fourth key issue for Magistrates is whether information is available about the 
involvement of children and the availability of suitable alternative accommodation 
for the applicant: 
“Not if there is some temporary accommodation for that person to attend” (2) 
“I would have to look into the necessity closely” (5) 
“I see no option if aggrieved spouse has no suitable alternative accommodation 
for herself and/or children” (37) 
Here we find evidence of the availability of refuge for women as a disincentive for 
the making of ouster orders.  That is, because a woman is more likely to have 
alternative emergency accommodation available to her than the male 
perpetrator, she is the one who is expected to leave the home.  In order for this 
issue to be addressed government must consider funding more men’s 
emergency accommodation services – however this should not be to the 
detriment of current or continued funding for women’s services which are already 
under-funded.    
This leads us then to consider two key reform possibilities.  Both reform options 
are based on the fundamental principle that legal practice and procedure in 
relation to ouster orders should “encourage women to make their own decisions, 
empowering them to take control of and rebuild their lives.”54 
 
The first reform possibility is, as WESNET has recommended, that there should 
be “a presumption in favour of an exclusion order where one has been requested 
                                                          
54  V Wensing (WESNET) “Why We Still Need Women’s Services in the Twenty First Century” in NSW 
Women’s Refuge Movement, Domestic Violence and Incest Resource Centre, Council to Homeless Persons 
(eds) (2001) Out of the Fire: Domestic Violence and Homelessness at 18. 
and where the safety of the protected person/children would not be compromised 
by remaining in the family home.”55  It has also been suggested that there be an 
obligation on the court, at least where children are involved, to consider making 
an ouster order, whether or not it has been requested.56 
 
The Home Safe Home Report takes the idea even further by suggesting that 
legislative change for ouster orders could involve making such orders 
presumptive standard conditions to all protection orders unless there are reasons 
why this is not possible or appropriate, for example, where the violence is too 
severe.57 
 
Second, the South Australian Domestic Violence Council (SADVC) in its Report 
on Legal Issues58 recommended a new “cooling off period” for expedited ex parte 
ouster conditions.  This proposal involves a “12 hour ouster order whereby the 
police, by telephone, can call a rostered Magistrate for an order to remove and 
detain the defendant for a period of 12 hours.  At the end of the time the 
defendant is released and no further action is taken.”59  The idea is based on an 
understanding that “many women express the view that they do not want the 
perpetrator charged with assault and do not want to add to their longer-term risk 
by applying for a restraining order, but they do want him removed and cooled 
off.”60  
 
Certainly, there are issues in relation to this proposal concerning civil liberties 
and arbitrary arrest.  Conversely, however, it is a central democratic right for 
women and children to be safe in their home.  It has also been acknowledged 
that such a system may increase risks for women by inflaming perpetrators.  
                                                          
55  J Earle for WESNET (1998)  Women’s Services Network Submission on Model Domestic Violence Laws, 
Canberra: AGPS at 6-7.  This reflects current laws in NSW which require “Magistrates to give 
reasons if they decline to make an exclusion order.”: Earle (1998) at 6. 
56  Earle (1998) at 6-7. 
57  The Home Safe Home Report (2000) at 58. 
58  South Australian Domestic Violence Council, (198?)  Report – Legal Issues Task Force. 
59  South Australian Domestic Violence Council at 102. 
60  South Australian Domestic Violence Council at 102. 
However, the SADVC responds to this issue by saying that any action taken by a 
victim is likely to be inflammatory and that this proposal may at least give them 
some breathing space to consider their options.61 
 
Finally, a recommendation has been made that “legislation be introduced 
whereby the perpetrator is made to compensate the woman or the service (she is 
forced to escape to) for the expenses incurred when a woman is forced to leave 
the home to escape domestic violence”62 
 
Conclusion. 
The purpose of this paper has been to discuss the findings of a 2000 survey of 
Queensland Magistrates attitudes to domestic violence.   While a number of 
themes have been identified throughout the survey, two issues were highlighted 
for discussion.  The first, that respondent Queensland Magistrates believe 
women use domestic violence as a tactic in Family Court proceedings and 
second, that Queensland Magistrates will only issue ouster orders when the 
circumstances are “bad enough”.   In both cases we have argued not only that 
such understandings are contrary to established research and literature but that 
in both cases, such attitudes markedly decrease the justice available for women 
who are victims of domestic violence.   Despite Queensland magistrates claims 
to the contrary, we believe that such attitudes do require more and specific 
training in order to raise awareness within the Magistracy and to contribute to 
justice for the victims of domestic violence. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
61  South Australian Domestic Violence Council at 103. 
62  Department of Families, Youth and Community Care (Qld) (1996) at 6. 
